I have never been reticent in expressing my love and admiration of America. I love the Americans who call it home.
As an Australian, I admire the exploits of their armed services ( when I was a boy during WW2 ) but it was my experience of living there in 1976 that cemented the attitude I developed and still have today.
America is presently going through a very bad patch and has dragged the rest of the Western World with it.
Since the end of WW2, the only thing that has stood between Communism and the life that most of the free world enjoys is America. The untold generosity to every beleaguered nation on this planet has not been appreciated by most of them.
Thank God for America.
In 1937 there were reports from American missionaries, and others who had visited China, about the atrocities being committed by the Japanese Army against Chinese civilians.
One of these was retired US Army Air Force General Claire Chenault who urged the President to declare war on Japan. These reports were received favourably with a majority of the Chiefs of Staff and the President in favour of attacking Japan. There was, however, one dissenting voice. That was General George Marshall, chief of the Army who stated that America was not capable at that time to engage in a war with Japan and the idea was dropped.
Following the end of WW1, and especially after the Peace Conference of 1919 when the disarmament proposals of then President Woodrow Wilson were adopted, American war production stopped and the few that remained were discouraged or penalised for producing war materials and weapons. The rationale was that if America had no military forces then it would be incapable of engaging in any war but more particularly in a foreign war. Public feeling was supportive of this isolationist approach which was reinforced by its Neutrality Acts.
Thankfully, President Roosevelt was a far-sighted leader and he took Marshall’s opinion seriously as the clouds of war were gathering in Europe.
On 14th November, 1938 a conference at the White House decided that in light of the Munich crisis, a planned gradual expansion of the Army was decided.
Video made 10 years ago
By 30th November, The War Plans Division produced a blueprint to expand the regular Army from 167,000 to 280,000 over a 2-year period and the National Guard from 190,000 to 240,000 enlisted men.
By 1st July, 1939 these figures had increased to 189,867 plus 110,000 reserves and 200,000 National Guards.
These enlistments were referred to as the Protective Mobilisation Plan. Simultaneously a second plan, the Industrial Mobilisation Plan was adopted to prepare for the economic mobilisation of the nation.
When war broke out in Europe on 1st. September, 1939, the President declared a State of Emergency on September 8th. As the war in Europe intensified the enlistment targets were progressively increased to a million-man army by 1st January, 1941 and 1,400,000 by 1st July, 1941.
On 7th December, 1941 (Pearl Harbour attack day) the recruitments had increased to 1,647,477 including National Guards. Between August and November, 1941, large scale manoeuvres were undertaken involving some 900,000 men but much of the equipment used was dummy due to lack of resources available. By 1st October, 1941 only 17 out of 34 Divisions were deemed ready for offensive combat action.
It was estimated at the time that if Germany were to invade the USA it would only need 5 divisions to take the entire country such was the parlous state of readiness and availability of munitions and armaments.
On the industrial front, a War Resources Board was established in August 1939 and disbanded on 30th November. On 25th May 1940 the President initiated the Office of Emergency Management and on 28th May he created the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defence.
On 18th December, 1941 Congress passed The First War Powers Act which gave the President power to reassign statutory functions of government departments and agencies.
The President knew that the wheels of government and the military worked too slowly in an emergency. He also knew that America at the time was the most efficient industrialised nation on Earth. In no other country was the average working family able to afford to own a motor car or a refrigerator and many other comforts of life that Americans took for granted.
He realised that the only solution to reaching the goals set was to engage private industry and to that end he chose two leading industrialists to take control of industrial production. In that, he was strongly supported by General Marshall. His first choice was William S Knudsen, then President of General Motors.
Bill Knudsen was born in Denmark in 1879 and migrated to America in 1900. In 1902 he began working for a bicycle factory in Buffalo, NY, which in 1904 began making parts for the Ford Motor Company. Ford purchased this company in 1911 and in 1914 he transferred to Ford’s Detroit plant where he was appointed to supervise all of Ford’s 28 assembly plants throughout the USA. He was also appointed director of Ford’s construction of submarine patrol boats for the US Navy during WW1.
In 1922 Knudsen had a falling out with Henry Ford and left to join General Motors. In 1924 he was appointed president and general manager of the Chevrolet Division of GM and in 1937 became president of the entire General Motors Corporation.
In 1940, President Roosevelt appointed him director of industrial production for The National Defence Research Committee. In 1941 he was appointed head of the US Office of Production Management. He was invested with the Army rank of Lieutenant General in 1942 in charge of production for the War Department until July, 1945 when he returned to private business.
In 1941 America manufactured 3,000,000 cars. In the following years until after the end of the war, 139 were made and these were used as staff cars. Knudsen’s background in mass production line manufacturing rendered him a perfect choice for the roles he was given by the President. Life was not easy for him to carry out these functions prior to the declaration of war with Germany and Japan in December, 1941.
Knudsen adopted a radical approach to war production. He allowed private companies to carry out government contracts without interference and he allowed them to make a profit. This was a different approach to what was happening in England and Europe generally where public servant oversight and intrusion was rampant in war production factories. The President knew that Knudsen knew that American industry had the know-how to do what it was being asked to do. His only interest was results. At the same time, America was blessed with a large labour force that had been very much under-employed during the 1930s depression.
The huge increase in opportunity for work was grasped by the American worker with enthusiasm.
After Dunkirk, the RAF was reduced to a total of approximately 700 airworthy aircraft.
It did not have the capability to replace what it had lost in a short space of time so it looked to America for supply. At the time America was not noted as a producer of aircraft and at the time there was no American company that produced fighter aircraft that would meet the standards required to fight the air war in Europe.
Britain approached the North American Aircraft Company to manufacture an aircraft that had been designed by the Curtis Aircraft Company. This was the P.40, or commonly known as the Tomahawk and it was as good as one could get at the time. North America replied that they would produce the prototype of a revised improved design in 120 days, a formidable undertaking in the eyes of conventional aircraft manufacturers but typical of the American “can do” ethic. North American completed their task with 3 weeks to spare and the P51 Mustang was born. Britain placed an order for 320 of these aircraft and North American went immediately into production.
The Mustang was designed to take advantage of American mass-production techniques. It was revolutionary in many respects predominantly for its construction with flush finishing lightweight rivets. The Mustang’s reception in Britain was mixed. Its top speed of 380 MPH and excellent manoeuvrability were admired but its performance above 15,000 ft was poor so it could only be used for low-level combat and with German invaders operating at 20,000ft or more its use in the defence of Britain was very limited.
Fortunately, the chief test pilot of Rolls Royce had flown the P51 and recognised that if it were fitted with one of the new breed of Rolls Royce Merlin engines it would be a far different aircraft. The problem was that Britain did not have the manufacturing capacity to produce the number of Merlin engines required for the P51. It was fully committed to producing engines for Spitfires and Hurricanes. The only option was to have them produced in America.
When Bill Knudsen received a call from Britain his immediate reaction was to contact the only company capable of carrying out the order; the Ford Motor Company. Ford was already an aircraft manufacturer. The Ford tri-motor, an aircraft similar in appearance to the Fokker that Kingsford Smith flew in his pioneering flight from Oakland to Brisbane, was already an established model for personal and freight transport.
Knudsen approached Edsel Ford, the son of Henry and then the president at Ford. He accepted the order for 6,000 Rolls Royce Merlin engines but was overruled by his father, Henry, who refused to manufacture engines for the British. Henry Ford was an avid supporter of American isolationist policy. He was adamant that Ford would not produce or sell its products to countries involved in war and, further, he was an arch enemy of President Roosevelt, a Democrat whom he considered was anti-free enterprise.
Henry Ford’s attitude to President Roosevelt was not confined to him alone. As the architect of the “New Deal” which was conceived by Roosevelt to remove the effects of the 1930s depression, severe restrictions and profit limitations were imposed on private businesses. This was resented by the vast majority of American business and particularly by big business which was the primary target and victim.
Knudsen knew that it was a hopeless task to convince Henry Ford to change his mind. Ford announced in the press that his company would not produce any war materials for countries at war so Knudsen then turned to the Packard Motor Company which had been a producer of luxury cars since 1910 and was well-versed in the science of mass production techniques.
When the plans and specifications arrived from Britain the American engineers could not make head or tail of them. The British manufacturing techniques were so far removed from the American methodology of mass production. The American engineers set about to convert the British plans and specifications to American mass production language where manufacturing processes were carried out by machines rather than skilled manual labour which was the practice in British factories. When Packard production got into full swing it was producing engines at triple the rate of British factories and their product was considered to be superior as well. Every Packard Merlin engine came with its own set of tools and spares. It was loved by British maintenance engineers as well as the pilots who flew the planes that were equipped with them.
In 1939 German aircraft production was 8,295. Britain produced 2,141. By 1941 German production had increased to 12,401 and American to 18,466. The Germans were suffering a rate of loss greater than its ability to replace them. Thanks to the back-up of American production Britain was able to maintain the replacement of lost aircraft at a rate equal to its own rate of loss.
Join me next week when we explore Episode 2
Happy Expat
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